Steve Hsu: So in the US the companies can, the rich people in the companies control the government. In China, the government controls the rich people and the companies

Jian Lian: regulated, I should say, regulated. You know, in Chinese history we have lot of such story. If you threaten the, the, our origins or threats emperor, you don't have a good results. That is common knowledge in China, you know, right? So your rich people doing your job, doing your job properly, and it's fair that you not only enrich yourself. Right. But also, you know, promoting locally, you know, at least your hometown. So that is basic requirement.

Steve Hsu: Welcome to Manifold. My guest today is Jian Lian. He is with us from Beijing, China. Lian is a policy analyst with a background in investment banking and also in venture capital. He has written widely on Chinese development, the Chinese development model, and I am looking forward to having this conversation with him in this special moment where the US and China are really at a, a very, very intense moment of competition.

So, Lian, welcome to the show.

Jian Lian: Hello, Steve. great to be your show. Yeah.

Steve Hsu: Thanks. So, we were just chatting before we started recording and you mentioned that you're a Beida or Beijing University graduate. Maybe you can tell us a little bit about your early life and, what you thought life was gonna be like in college, and then how it developed after that.

Jian Lian: Okay. So actually, you know, I entered Peking University, Beijing University. Actually it was, was number two best university in China through very fierce university entrance examination. I, I am 23rd in my province, Fuji Province, which, you know, just facing Taiwan. At that time it was 2001.

And, I originally wanted to study biology because at that time, you know, it is a, a genetic mapping period become very popular. However, I was forced to enter the school economics because of entrance examination, small difference. I become economic, I would say economic theory, fence.

Actually I developed my own economic theory in university. I got seven years in. In, in Peking University and when I come to the work in the work markets, it was at, on eve of global financial crisis. So actually I witnessed the, the, the broke out of, global financial crisis. Actually, I was in Lehman Brothers, three months at the time in the summer of 2007, and then 2008 I entered the industry firstly as industrial analyst.

And actually I keep, strong academic ties with Peking University, including particularly on 2008. I should say it's dramatic, period because on that year in the China's strategy circle, China, how to say, China school there is called China School rise up exactly on the autumn of 2008 or early 2009.

And I experienced it and I am actually a member perhaps at that time, the youngest member of it. Then there is, there is, you know, industry party and go going up. That is, you know, it is not a government sponsormovements. It's a totally how to say internet. Firstly, grow up internet circle, actually, uh, it appears around 2003, 2005, among of BBS in China forum.

Okay. And then in, in grow up and turn into reality and truly, it, it goes sponsorship privately, not from government again, I should say. So they, we found some kinds of, patriotic in China, patriotic in western, maybe called nationalistic, , circle. And then in 2012, some, some media platform pair.

And also, you know, we, it have a new Chinese leadership. So then I think that the two wave joined together gradually. Gradually. And then the, you know, in recent how to say, 15 years, I witness, Including some implementation of the national China school and also industry party policy in real policies.

And also they represented the enterprises, which you are not

Steve Hsu: I, can I interrupt you a little bit? So I, I have to slow you down for my listeners who are not completely familiar with all the things you're discussing. So first lemme go back to, I think you said something very interesting. You said you were 23rd in the Gaokao for the entire province of Fuji.

Is that, is that what you

Jian Lian: Yeah, yeah, yeah. I am, I mean, I'm ranking the 23rd, so there are 17 70,000 students participate in that examination for science, your science major, because you have a arts major. So arts major 20,000. We have 70,003 to one, and I'm 23rd amount of 70,000.

Steve Hsu: right. So let me ask you, I think you said you wanted to study genomics, but if you had scored higher, like if, yeah. If you had been 20 instead of

23, they would've let you study genomics.

Jian Lian: Yeah. If I'm 22 or 21, I will be in the school of life science.

Steve Hsu: Wow. So you ended up, but unfortunately, well, fortunately for us, you ended up in economics. Is that right?

Jian Lian: Maybe, maybe. Maybe because I, I do think I could do more things. I, I choose, continue to be a major economics. Yeah.

Steve Hsu: Yeah, I mean, I don't know if you know this, but I actually work in, I mean, I'm a physicist, but I do some work in computational genomics and I, I've actually founded two companies in that field. So it's funny that you, that's, that's what you wanna study in, in high school. I actually got into that field right around around 2010.

Jian Lian: So about the time you were in school, I think. okay. So now you mentioned two different viewpoints or movements on China Pol maybe political economy is the right way to describe it. So one of them is the industrial party and the, the earlier one that you mentioned is the, what did you call it? The China NationalOkay. not, not exactly that I call the China school. So, China school is, is more, more like a theory or, or philosophy or history an arts. And, but it's strongly related to industry party. The industry party is mainly related to the science the industry policy engineer and what kinds of enterprises that we should support.

For example, why do you support BYD? Okay. So BYD is a typical example of Rise up in recent 15 years, of China's, success. So industry po party support him, support this, this company and China's school also support him. They just support him from different perspective, but they are strongly linking each other.

So if we are talking to about different camps, I should say, it's more like a western school, you know, in China's 1980s, intellectuals are more influenced than the western world because at that time it's more in higher dominant economy and also on, on industry policy or economics. That is another school which competing, you can call the liberalist, economic liberalist in China and pure liberalist.

However, industrial par party is also encouraging innovation. So, you know, it is not like he is, you know, state, more like a status. So it's anti-innovation because I, I, I message theory, explanation to polarization in, in many of the, discussion. But no, actually, industry party also favors innovation.

But it's talking about what kinds of innovation. For me, for example, I'm strongly pro innovation and I, I actually pro support many, many of the entrepreneurs. And actually I can tell you, most of them come pro private, not in state-owned companies. Some very innovative people from state-owned company may not be able to let live there and come out and sell their own company.

I strongly support it, but I, I do think I'm member of industry party, and I do support some of the industry policy I know, which is industry po policy works, which not, doesn't. I'm also personal experience. Oh, so, so that is what the two, two school I mentioned are actually same, similar group of people.

They are. They even overlap with each other.

Steve Hsu: Okay. But let, maybe, let me focus on the industrial policy, sorry, the industrial party because I discussed this a little bit with a previous guest, Kyle Chan, who's a Chinese American at Princeton. and at least, and by the way, everything I say to you is probably more from a kind of American perspective, so feel free to correct. Feel free to correct anything I say, which is inaccurate or, you know, I, I realize like I only have the, an outsider's perspective about what really happened in China, say in the last 20 years. So there's this perspective that in the 2010s, there there was a, a real rise of internet companies, but there's a perception that that kind of technology building apps websites, e-commerce is not a kind of deep technology. It's not a real industrial base for the full development country.

Jian Lian: Yeah.

Steve Hsu: late lately, a lot of American thinkers, intellectuals have encountered the Industrial Party in China, which advocates more for things like manufacturing, building real

Jian Lian: You are right.

Steve Hsu: Something called industrial maximalism saying that there's no such thing as oversupply in China.

China should just continue developing its manufacturing capability until it, you know, maybe even eventually dominates the whole world in many different verticals.

Jian Lian: Mm-hmm.

Steve Hsu: but I think what you were saying at the beginning is maybe the early evolution of that industrial party view did not come from the government.

It came from people talking to each other on the Chinese internet, even going back to something called BBS, which for Americans is kind of just like a chat, chat forum. People

Jian Lian: Chat forum.

Steve Hsu: chat forum. But as we all know, in the internet age, a lot of intellectual stuff comes from there, not necessarily from the government or from universities.

And so there was some early theorizing about what is the best development path for China. That industrial party is a particular view on how it should work. And your book, you wrote a book which was published I think 2016, but you had been writing it the years before that the book is called The Truth About Capital, capital Markets and the Internet, and some aspects of your book are really anticipating or, endorsing some of the views of the industrial party. So do I, do I have the, the rough picture right, of what you were talking about.

Jian Lian: Yes, exactly.

Steve Hsu: Okay. So let's talk about, imagine there's a debate going on in the 2010s in China, and on one side you have people like Jack Ma or people who are really pro internet. They're really pro western perspective. I think you mentioned this. They, they tend, they tended to think everything that came from the west was good.

Jian Lian: Mm-hmm.

Steve Hsu: liberalism was good. The internet was good, and maybe they weren't that interested in China manufacturing things or making things physically. Talk a little bit about the, the, the, the debate between those two different position in China in the 2010s.

Jian Lian: Okay. So lemme start a little bit, of history earlier than that. That is from the 1980, 1990s, early 1990s and two thousands. So I should say that China government, because, uh, you say industry parties mainly from actually the folk society, not from government. And I should mention a little bit about government because I think that is a mystery or or miss of American discussion with China.

So you know, Chinese government also, man, so let, let's just all remain. So, uh, traditionally we, we, we have some tradition which was thinking good by today's industry party, is that. So communist party in America may be a negative word, but in China is positive word because there is principle, working for the part for the people.

So if you, you, you are thinking for the people, you're thinking about production, you are thinking about making people access to some necessity. So there is a real economy transition in Chinese policy. Real economy emphasize real economy. Even today, that's a real economy. This world has a natural political legitimacy in the political discussion.

So this is a traditional government. However, since the, 1980s, there's a reform opening up. So we absorbed lots of concept from the west and including the government in the gentleman period in al period. Okay. The government even standing, including the officials to trend in Singapore and trend in, and maybe Harvard in, Columbia University or something.

So, uh, once a time the similar to the Jack Ma theory, of thinking, style thinking is prevailing also in China. So once a time, for example, in, in the sum of the today very, very heated topic like semiconductor policy. Basically Chinese government gave up the support of domestic Chinese semiconductor industry.

So basically, actually this low point actually was in 1990s, two thousands and, basically 2000, yeah, end of 2011. How to say, Chinese government's per perspective, but there is genome, genes behind it on supporting real economy andmanufacturing. So it just wait time to revive it.

And, and because of the Western influence, the Chinese government also used to think that e-commerce okay, represent the advanced technology and so on. So internet was also accurate supported in, for example, 1990s, late 1990s. If, let tell Johnson means late periods discussion about technology is all way to it. Sometimes biology, so it's very similar to United States thinking. So I, I, that is, I call this, is actually Silicon Valley technology definition head government. It's actually not good actually, you know. So this will will direct more resources, policy, resources to the internet companies making the it super platforms.

That is what you witness today. We, we both have super platforms in, in, in China and in America, even in other countries. Okay. However, that's so that is the reaction movements from the, BBS. Then they, they, they, from industry party, they say that we should focus not only on it, we should also pay attention manufacturing because I should say on, on two 19 19th and, and early 21st century, China's rise actually mainly related to manufacturing because of the globalization.

So industry based, moving to China, many industry, all industries moving to China, and also China's domestic, not only driven by export, but also ourself, infrastructure, building, urbanization. There is lots of, for example, steel companies. steel was thinking to be so-called transitional industry and many of countries in China, the government definition used to be however, we, you know, that still we have different steel, we have special steel, we have, you know, super steel.

So there is lots of technology also on this feed. So industry party emphasize on this that we should pay attention to this. The question is that how to formalize these continue,technology innovation in these states. There's no such discussion in the west because the west has entered de-industrialization, foreign globalization process particularly in the 1990s and accelerated in the, in the 21st century.

So discussion is in China. So, so that is industry party and, and genes. Some genes transition in government, they intersect with each other and then forming a systematic view of what China policy should be. By the way, I should add one. One, yeah. I, I, to add one topic. Okay. So on the Chinese government transition, there's a very, very important, very, very important elements on one industry electricity.

So China is, you know, because we have used to have a prime minister called, you know, he is an educating Soviet Union, so he is expert on electricity. So in the 1990s when, when the the west is Deindustrialization, you know, Des Moines hydro dams, China is strengthening, we have three gorge. So three Gorge approach is very important to continue this transition in China.

So we become the very important country actually absorb all the knowledge from USA, from Europe, from Soviet Union, from Japan here. And then we, you know, refine it and promote it to, for example, our state grid. And this support, China's search on new energy and also new energy vehicles and also today's AI is a huge power consumption.

And while the same time the stagnation of that same period in us, area in the United States forming obstacle for the development of the lease area. So, yeah.

Steve Hsu: Great. So actually let me put up Mark there, bookmark. We'll come back and talk about the electricity grid in China because I, I think this is an important topic, but coming back to the political economy and the, the ideas that are circulating in China, I think you said, so the industrial party really has its origins in the people outside the government, people writing on the internet.

But I think you said the government has, I didn't catch the word you used, did you say genes? The,

Jian Lian: Yeah. I, I, because transition,transition embedded the transition on this.

Steve Hsu: Yes. So within the communist ideas in the government, there's an idea of their ideas about material production, producing the basic goods that people need. And so there, there, there's, there's some continuous emphasis on that kind of thing, going back all the way to the origins of like modernization and things like that.

Jian Lian: Yes, yes, yes. Yeah.

Steve Hsu: But I wanna ask you, so the, the, the Western caricature, the cartoon picture that we have of how the Chinese society decides what to do, is that it's all top down coming from the government, and the government decides, and then that's, that's what society does.

But for these particular policies that the industrial party supported during these years, was it just a coincidence that the government decided to do what the industrial party proposed? Or was there some complicated interaction between voices outside the government and voices inside the government that ultimately led to the policy?

So maybe can give some color on how it worked.

Jian Lian: Okay. Okay. So, just give you example, which then now you focus semiconductor. Okay. So how, so how semiconductor boom was starts, you know, taking place in China you know, before 2012, because at, at that time, I'm already industry analyst. I have very strong impression that China's semiconductor is very poor, you know, in the poor states.

Because lack of enough founding before 2012, there's only how to say that the state, state project, which is not enough, and actually most important at time, there's no venture capital invest in China, in invest in semiconductors. They all, they all invest, you know, internet like Jack Ma, okay. Like Baidu, okay.

like, okay. And things change because one member of the industry party, actually, he's a defacto member of industry party. He is a actually engineering ma master, I think. And later he got PhD in United States, not on ee, but on sociology. He writes a, a advice paper with 10,000 Chinese world we call, okay. 10,000 Chinese worlds on semiconductor development. And his classmen happened to be you know, lower rank of issue in the MIIT industry information technology. And he's my friend, this writer is my friend, okay? He is a very, very kind of talents between the science engineer and policy. He's super smart people. He is the number one people in his, you know, high school examination. And he has responsibility. So he write this paper and then he hand it to our deputy Prime Minister at the time, who used to be the, the head of the,NDRC, which is God friend, Chinese version of Soviet Go. So, he adopted, his idea was adopted. So later, I think in your area, you may heard of China has a microphone on semiconductor, with very, very big money. And this big money, firstly, was investing into the fabs, SMIC and knew it, rev revolutionized from Taiwanese people because S-M-I-S-E actually founded Mad Taiwanese people.

And so that is the result of interaction between the, the non-government people which belonged had idea, national Party and recommended and political crazy system, makers China has such issue who is smart to listen to such advice and then make it reality. So actually, you know I, I won't, a good small group of us want to be the consultant from mega fund, actually originally on 2014.

So, okay, so that is 33. So, so that is your example. Typical example. Yeah.

Steve Hsu: Let me, so let me recap that again for the listeners. So you personally know someone who is a, has a background in ee but also in social science. And this person is an intellectual, not part of the government actually.

Jian Lian: Yes. Yeah.

Steve Hsu: he convinced some, not the highest ranking official, right. But, but somewhat senior official that China should put some emphasis on building its semiconductor capability. And this, this eventually led to what we call here, the, the big fund. I think in English. Yeah. Okay. And so would, this would've been in the 2010s, right? This is, this is,

It happens on 2012. The first year all year zero of our national leadership come to power. And it, it was adopted in 2013, and it was launched in 2014. Got it. Okay. So it's an example of. The influence of actual thinkers. I mean, when, when someone writes a 10,000 word policy paper and, but there's someone in government who's smart enough to understand it and it becomes implemented. It's an example of, decision making in China, not being top down, right?

It's, you know, different parts of society are participating right in, in determining what the international strategies are gonna be. Now I think if for the people who really wanted to westernize China liberals, people who really trusted the United States, right, as kind of the big brother, you know, the friendly big brother of China, they might've said, oh, we don't need semiconductors. We can just buy our semiconductors

Jian Lian: you are right. Exactly. Exactly. Yeah. Yeah.

Steve Hsu: The position that China's in now where it controls all of its major supply chains, right. Almost every major supply chain, like, except for NVIDIA and ASML, you know, the, you know, maybe ASML is the most important one except for some very rare

exceptions.

In 2025, China kind of controls all its supply chains, but it didn't have to be that way. If people, if people were willing to be codependent on the west, then they wouldn't necessarily build all of that domestic supply chain. Right. So was that a explicit policy? How did that become an explicit policy in China? That China should control all of its major supply chains?

Jian Lian: I should say that it is not kinds of, China intent in, you know, from the beginning that China has, you know, a very clear, initiative to control globally this spread chain. Basically it is forming when we, we will start to do it because China. China, yes. Chinese is very efficient and, and, and energetic.

So when we started to want something, for example, when we, we adopt the strategy of developing electrical vehicle, and then finally we find that we pause that basically German and Japan in many perspective. So they got nervous. Such argument used to study with the national, economic safety.

Even I can tell you that EV strategy is not related climate change topic at the beginning. BYD is reason for developing its EV in, for example, 2003, 2004 is not related to climate change. It's related to get rid of the oil independency overseas because China have not coal. We can generate electricity.

Okay. Of course hydropower can also generate electricity. So in this way, China's transport system. Besides the rail. Okay. On, on the lows, the vehicles could use ev strategy to get independent from the oil dependence. So, so you some, many of the i of the, topic we, we discussed today is not you know, at the beginning is not like what you imagine.

It's from a, from another reason, and this reason I should say it is a very natural reason for a super large country like China. So, you know, today, sometimes I can understand United States, some people are arguing that we should also have guarantee a basic industry base. Russian people is also talking about reason .

I understand that The question is that what extent and what strategy you can usually adopt.

Steve Hsu: So would you say at some point though, perhaps in response to US sanctions in the last five or seven years. The Chinese did develop an explicit view that they should control their key supply chains, be because those supply chains might be cut off by the United States. Like did that become an explicit component of strategy in recent years?

Jian Lian: Well, I should say that in many perspective we should, thanks to sanctions, for example, US ancients on, on Huawei, making Huawei home chaotic, make Huawei more in know, supporting China's domestic innovation chain industry supply chain. Because otherwise, Huawei is not kinds of you know so-called national nationalistic inclined company that many Western imagine.

No, it's not actually somewhat, not, not 100%. It's opposite. So, so for example, on its supply chain purchase, they used to favor Western supply, on the key components. So in this way that there is no positive feedback for China's self, you know, innovation. Or some is catching up, some is not, not catching up.

Some is, you know, from another pass demand strategy, technology, very unique. But Huawei's strategy used not supporting. However, in 2018, it was actions as a good, so in this way that we are making a big purchase domestically. So, so it started positive feedback. I should say this become consensus in China now.

Yes.

Steve Hsu: Okay, but consensus because of US actions. Because of US sanctions.

Jian Lian: I should say that the US for example, Biden's chief, act accelerated, acceler accelerated, yes. Yeah,

Steve Hsu: So I think you and I are in agreement. My perception is that a lot of the Chinese companies prior to these sanctions would prefer just to use the existing Western suppliers. Why, why should you risk, why should you risk your fab, the efficiency or the, the yield of your fab on some local product when you can just buy the product from Japan or

Jian Lian: South Korea, for example. Japan. Yeah.

Steve Hsu: Right? But when forced to do that, then it created a, it, it aligned the interests, it solved a coordination problem amongst all these Chinese companies. They realized like, we have to work together. Otherwise, you know, the US can just cut us all off. So that's something that most Americans, to this day, even most American think tank analysts and economists don't understand this point, they, they don't understand the counterfactual is China.

Chinese companies still prefer to use Western suppliers, and they don't prefer using the company just down the street from them. And, and, but now, all that, yeah, go ahead.

Jian Lian: Yeah. So, I should emphasize there are actually two points emerging,from, such, you know, how to say the feedback cycle. Firstly, is that China more and more confident because, well, you just let China's try Chinese China. There's lots of talents. You know, I, I, I, for example, myself was 23rd in 70,000, you know children.

Okay? So, this positive facts showing that China could innovate on many things, not only catching up, but also from, you know, another you know, development route, technology route. So this, this logic appear in more and more fees in the past, you know, 10 years. So those argument now, you know, we can buy from outside arguments slowing down, it's going down, okay?

That's first, first thing. Second thing is that I should say that compared with China, the, problem for the west, industry network is that German and Japan. Supply chain key players, they, they aging because for these two countries for example, semiconductor, they, they use a lot of very specific fine chemicals, okay?

They, they, they need some very, very high precision machine components, machine machining. However, you should know that these industry never go venture capital investment in the west. They're just usually, you know, family run or, you know, some departments in a big company in German or Japan, some is, you call hidden champagnes.

But hidden champagnes unfortunately never got support from venture capital from United States and Japan. They don't have much venture capital in China, in a very, very sharp countries, you know, semiconductor, very popular, uh, in last 10 years. So, so in this industry, sharing lots of hidden champagne nature companies positions, they also got, uh, venture capital.

This is very different. So because there is no incentive in the Western network, so the, the, the entrepreneurs for these hidden champions in Japan, they're Asian. They, I was told they usually sixties, I mean, in their sixties, seventies. So they will retire and they descend, never want to inherit. However, in contract in China, we are not, we are the people in forties, 1350s in twenties to do the same similar job or even, you know, newer job.

So the systematic evolution in China is much, much accelerated. Actually on this year, on spring of Shanghai spring 2025, I attend a Semicon 2025 and it has all become largest in exhibition for the semiconductor hardware and chemicals and all these hardware inputs. So that is a flu of China's emphasize, even venture capital.

We emphasize hard technology. So this, this change was taking place in 2017, 2018 because this term heart tech heart tech was innovated by someone from the CAS system. And I know that, that people actually Exactly. So I witness the rise of heart attack. Personally, I don't think it's enough. I think it should be, you know, adjusted to be more efficient.

But I, I I should say that the development hard hire and its, its achievement has beyond my expectation in back in 2015. And I'm honest, I'm very satisfied with the, the current result we see. But I think there's more room to, to do because there more innovation people in China is worth supporting. So that is my basic conclusion.

Steve Hsu: You good? You raised a bunch of points that I want to drill down into. So one, you mentioned the human capital issue, that a lot of these, I think you call them hidden, hidden champions in Japan and Germany. Yeah, so these are key companies in the supply chain. They're maybe not glamorous in start with venture capital, but the people staffing those companies and with the key knowhow knowledge are getting close to retirement or even past retirement age.

Jian Lian: yes. Yes.

Steve Hsu: the, the strongest Chinese companies, the, the people leading the teams are 20, 30, 40 years old. So they have, they need more decades left of run in, in their own career. And I, that's apparent to me as well, when I go to China and I, there are so many young world-class scientists and technologists, it's very different from what you. You know, the situation in the west. So, so the demographic problem, I think, at least for the next 20 years, is actually on to China's advantage. China has a better human capital situation for the next 20 years. Their, their human capital is actually gonna continue to increase over next 20 years. So so you mentioned that now you said the performance the idea to emphasize hard tech or hard science in China, you could maybe even trace it to a particular individual in the Chinese Academy of Sciences.

May maybe say something more about, yeah, go ahead.

Jian Lian: Well, well this, this tag in China called Koji. Okay. It, it was a, it is a term coined by really a scientist in CAS system called, millet. So he is a doctor, his PhD on

photonics, I think. So he was a PhD in Photonics Machine Institute of CAS system. And, you know that is, that institute was located in Shiyan.

Shiyan is very special city. It is not the first steel city, but it's a Asian capital of China. And it is also, uh, the industry, one of the most important industry cluster, uh, in 1950s when Soviet aided China's industrialization. But in the 1990s, even the early 2000, I think it is a, it is a, you can call the gray city.

It is that no one pay attention to it. So there's lots of including the military industry, including the, the, the, the research there. However, they don't go support from the Chinese government in 1990s. So the pay is low and so on. Of course, man, no venture capital go there. And then the CA system, they got some, their own invention. They think that it, it was some kinds of, investment. So they go to Shanghai and Beijing to look for investment venture capital and zero, you know, that is, that happened, I was told in 2010, and then go back to sh and say, why don't we set up our own venture capital?

So, so they go to the, the, the code producing area of Sanhi province, which is quite a relatively rich at that time. They go to Yang. Okay? They go, they go to Yulin. So they, they collect money from those private attributes, invest in our project, and also set the angel funds at the time, very small in scale.

And then what happens is that they just catch up our new leadership. So, so layer, layer, lay achievements, starting up achievement in two years. Got attention from our top governments, and then our national leader, when he visit inspect Sanhi Province, they, he visited this institute and saying that this is a good model.

And then get support firstly from Shiyan City government and then Sanchi provinal government. And later actually, I, I participate, contribute a little bit. I, I contribute,

I, I think 300 million Chinese yuan founder fund investment to the to, to lay angio fund from, Beijing City government.

So, uh, in the year of 2015, after the year of 2015, with the start rise of megaphone semiconductor, there is a wave of national venture capital. So, so this hard tech technologies, definition and its promotion got recognition for central government. So it started a hard technology investment booming in China.

So every local government, because local government is very, very important economic engine in Chinese system. So they also,tried the forms of venture capital after 2015. So these hard tech movements absorb lots of such investment flow and then. Invest in those project in favor. So that is, how this study, however, from my per point of view, that they are no hot tech enough.

That is related to one, one, I should say that, Silicon Valley, technology, definition Haga because Silicon Valley has a power to define, which is technology, which is not, and they leads to the resources location. However, many of the, of the area they, they invest is some kind of hype type.

For example, I should just give example, for example. I think that's organic chemistry is very important and it will not pay attention to for decades in the West. Of

course in China, we are just production. But the, the new, innovation in this area is very important. However, the Silicon Valley will define that.

For example, synthetic biology is very popular, is sexy. So you just invest in synthetic biology. However, synthetic biology is production costs might be numerous times than you know, the goods, organic chemistry methods. So for the heart tech movement today, which I'm not satisfied there, they still invest a loss following the, the Silicon Valley defined sexy area, not clearly defined type of concept.

Okay. This area is very important. It's the strategic need by our country. even for the humankind, the develop is very important, so we should invest on that. No, so, so, so that is, let start this concept, but not good enough. But that is the, the process of hightech movement and related to hightech movements, promotion. So you, what we witness is that regulation on the super IT platform, you know, because that,lease in the late, I should say in the late 2000 tens, there is obviously signals that lease IT platforms is producing monopoly. So, so I know that some, we many Western observers are confusing. Why our need leader Xi Jinping was so harsh, you know, Jack Ma on Alibaba, including on later regulation tension on the year of 2019, 2020, for example, there is stop of the IPO of the armed financial because we have realized that, if you only develop it, it will only lead to, you know, a, a monopoly power on the e-commerce and also the eFinance.

So actually China is not so friendly in the consumer loans activities through the, the it. So the FinTech is not you know, very, very popular, even legitimate in China because China, you know, including will, will have a harsh limits on crypto mining activity. We, we actually stop it. So all these community, actually many Chinese, but now they live overseas.

So that is you know, the phenomenon took place in after 2015. Yeah.

Steve Hsu: So the, the western version of the story is that when she took power, he stupidly cracked down on people like Jack Ma. And he caused a kind of winter or depression for the most innovative internet entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, financiers, FinTech people. Many of these people left China or just took their money and ran.

I think now, only now people are realizing the flip side of that story is that lots of really important, hard tech, hard tech, which allows China to actually control lots of key supply chains in the world, in the global economy were developed in instead of those monopolistic internet platforms. And and the platform, the monopolies were kind of held under control by Xi.

I think only just now are western intellectuals or economic, analysts coming to this realization. Whereas just a few years ago, the story was just China is a basket case. Now she has ruined innovation in China. They were actually quite happy about this because they thought, oh, China will never catch up.

And, and now there's no, there's very little venture capital in China, et cetera, et cetera. So, I think people in the industrial party realize this ultimately is a victory for Chinese development. Not, not

Jian Lian: Yeah,

Steve Hsu: was not a bad set of policies from Xi. Is, is that fair?

Jian Lian: Well, I should say that of course there are different opinion in Chinese society. So some, I should say some Chinese, including entrepreneur class, they, they have similar view of, you mentioned about. But usually loads entrepreneurs not from you know, the, especially high level manufacturing is maybe related from, for example, real estate sector from the, service sector.

They, they may have a similar view. They, they were treated, Jack Ma as you know, superheroes. However, Jack Ma was never only superhero in Chinese society. They are all two sides of views, including the views on, on tension Alibaba and also, by the way, but on, on TikTok, on ByteDance also.

So that's different opinions. I can, I can tell directly because ByteDance founders, you know, he come from same hometown for me. So when, when TikTok our hometown middle school circle, we have a word, we say, this app may have points because like only speaking, make people addicted. So that the internet development, the APP app development in China we, we admit that it, it make people convenient in, in life.

Definitely. That is his job. Okay. His achievement, we thank him. However, we, we have very early we see potential danger or monopolize and control. So China actually adopts, I should say widely adopt the policy pre early, preventing all. So if you look at the situation in, in Russia for example, I want my Russian friends that you taking care of those, you know, super APP because it will, you know, it will, their business actually will very quickly, you know, go into the, the consumer loans.

They, you, by the way, they don't giveproduct company loans over. They only solely rely on consumer loans. And sometime we will come into pre loans. So, you know, the, the people who was assassinated, Charlie Kirk he was complaining about the, the, the predict loans phenomenon in United. In China, we have do the early, so I always say that why Charlie Kirk, or, you know, low cost, you go to China to see, you know, you prioritize Avid that you treat us any, but actually you should learn from this.

We have, we have early predict all of this and prevent this. So today are Alibaba and UN financial was under control, is kinds of become a public welfare platform. So you, you should not unmark super high profits through loans, consumer loans, but you provide, you know, universal accessible financial service to the all people.

So, so that is a perfect, I should say, a perfect integration with socialist and also Confucius, you know, Chinese traditions, Confucius idea with the modern technology.

Steve Hsu: Yeah.

Jian Lian: so that is my attitude. Yeah.

Steve Hsu: I think the, the simplified way of expressing this is to say that in the United States, companies are allowed to become all powerful and eventually the companies control the government because the way our political system works

Jian Lian: yeah.

Steve Hsu: to the top, you need to raise a lot of money and you raise that money from billionaires and oligarchs and big companies. And so it's

very tough to break up a monopoly, even if it's an obvious monopoly because. That company by that time, has so much influence in government. So in the US the companies, the rich people in the companies control the government. In China, the government controls the rich people and the companies.

Jian Lian: We regulated, I should say, regulated in, you know, in Chinese history we have lots of such story. If you threaten the, the, our regions or threaten the emperor, you, you don't have a good results. That is common knowledge in China. You know, so your rich people doing your job, doing job properly, and it's best that you not only enrich yourself, but also, you know, promoting locally, you know, at least your hometown.

So that is basic requirement.

Steve Hsu: Got it. So let's come back to, we're, I'm still unpacking, you said so many interesting things like 10 minutes ago. I still wanna come back and unpack some, so,

Jian Lian: Mm-hmm.

Steve Hsu: in, is it 2015? We had the maid in China 2025 Plan. That's right. And you said you're more than satisfied with the rate of success that maybe 70% of the main goals in that document have actually been achieved.

You. And in fact, looking forward from 2015, you would've been, you know, very, very happy if they told you, Hey, 70% of these goals are gonna be achieved. And I, in fact, I think in your book you actually, anticipated a lot of the priorities of made in China 2025. So maybe just talk about that. So what, for my listeners who aren't that familiar with the document, what are the main goals that were in made in China 2025? What are the things they succeeded on and what are the things that they still need to work on?

Jian Lian: So the, the, the made China 2025, they have seven or eight, I don't remember. Goals, industry goals. So if specific industry goals. So some of them are widely, not days. Such new energy vehicle that is most widely know. Okay. BYD is the a TL battery, uh, producer. And then it is new energy and then it is you know, so-called borrowed concept from German or, even United States that smart manufacturings actually, I don't like the word.

Okay, it is too high. Okay. But however, for example, robotics and actually, uh, something which that very usually ignore. Machine tools, heavy machines. New materials. New material including chemistry, organic chemistry, and also steel metal. Okay. And then of course, medicine, they call advanced medicine medical machine machines and well, there maybe others.

Okay. I don't remember. But basically it such, of course also the, the rail rail technologies, for example, high speed railway and components and so on. So this story actually started earlier than that. Some, some area of them has, earlier launch event, for example, high speed rail. So that is a story in happens, 10 years ago, earlier than 2000 fifteens planned, 2005, that at that time our Ministry of Railway, minister of railway launched this and absorbed, of course, it's firstly it's integration for oversee technology.

And then we integrated. And, and actually by the way, it is very similar to what happens in electricity technology, that because China is owning countries who has huge investment on infrastructure in, the rail network, just like, the electric network before. So all the technology flow to China and then there's offer Chinese tails solve it and reinvent it.

I think that the first area which mark become the, the milestone is, is very technology and then almost at the same time, but a little slow is new energy vehicle. But lemme tell you, it is, it is a, it is not a story that started smoothly from beginning to end. No, it's with tomorrow.

So actually for me, I followed BYD since 2007. 2008. 2007, eight. So I personally witnessed how, how dramatic dramatic rise by how difficult. How many difficulty, obstacle he has overcome and tomorrow he overcomes from this period. So in my heart, that one, Trump, who the founder, BYD, is truly industry hero.

And what happens on the, on, on a, on a, I think this is a landmark achievements for 2025, many 20, 20 25, is that, on that year, there is a new megaphone founded similar to the semiconductor megaphone, which is at the fund. I worked for once, for five years, and it was formally run put into operation in 2016.

But manual investment was decided in 2015. So two of them, very, very important investment, one to BYD, one to CATL. So that become a turning point for the China's ev industry chain because before that there's lots of dispute or arguments against that, whether they are fake or whether they're true.

You know, VYD was including his product, you know, including his product, for example they have E six, in 2011. That is the first truly ev, which put into circulation by BYD. And later there is Ching. The first generation chain iso say that first gener chain is not so beautiful. It's quite ugly.

however,so, and the key moments when BYD is short of cash that national fund stuck in, and then he, he raise a, just raise a flag at that time. BYD is already, you know, IPO. It's a populistic company. How the national venture capital just entered by, I become the 10% leading investor among the additional sales shares.

And that's additional sale shares making 15 one 5 billion Chinese UN to BYD. And the national venture capital took 10% of it. Because if there's no such national VC say, I'm first person this model, this, they, at that time, this additional share sale with no buy. So it entered the, the industry at a critical moment.

And that is I mean the turning point. And you see that after local government jumping in, jumping in just a semiconductor story. And EV is developed faster than semiconductor because only speaking the industry channel of EV is simpler than semiconductor or than transitional car. So actually I focus, there could be a new cluster of EV industry.

I mean from upstream forming in China. I have this feeling around 2017 and later I see, oh, truly, you know, different company emergent, even only once I treated the hype topic that is, you know the, the self-driving. So, so there is lots of example laser, you know components and used to be very express.

Today is super cheap today. So that, that is new case of how China industrialize everything, industrial them into, you know, a, very, very cheap and affordable industry components that could be used and achieve something, some function. And then for others area, I just give example of robotics and, machine tool.

So actually at that time as a little unsatisfied because I think that machine tool is very important, but at the beginning, including national venture capital they are actually also dominant by the hype idea of Silicon Valley. So at first they pay very attention. Little attention to machine tool and Chinese machine tool industry used to be in very harsh situation over a year, about 2015 actually.

So it just in transition from stay on enterprises to private enterprises. So today China's new emergence booming machine tool industries, all private. It's all private. Very contrast to Western imagination. And robotics it needs the, the key here is actually the key component, for example, this accelerator here, you know, so, so the robotics needs, much mechanical components, and that's manufacturing needs pretty hybrid precision, you know, griding and, you know, cutting and all of these things.

So, China's a good experience that we pay attention to these components. And we have lots of several candidates who invest, among our, you know, it's usually not in Beijing or Shanghai. It's in, at least in the suburb Shanghai or even in England, in Suho, in ui, in Zu or province, or even in the land province.

So you can find these Chinese new generation hidden champions there. And these national venture capital and provincial supported venture capital invest this in the principle hightech, company support. That's support emergence of high precision machining and robotics and machine tools research how the renaissance industry Renaissance.

And on the medicine I should say that it's a more complicated topic because there's two schools. One is that Chinese medicine should have positions in the new landscape. One. The other is you know, from, not from political, but from science view that, okay, we should follow the western medicine idea for the innovation medicine definitely is almost 100% western medicine.

So they, they, they usually PhD come back from USA and Europe and come back in China, found the innovation medicine companies start up and then got investment. This become a hype, fever, fever, in the year of 2015, 2021. It got lots of money. And personally, I'm, I'm observing this, how to say community.

And I actually, I participate with some of the investment case here. However, I, have my own view on, but the, the result to pretty simple here is that China's on this area, this is a actually very hype area in Silicon Valley. China also achieve success. Success as you know, that many big farmers in the west is now buying, buying ips from the Chinese, a star on a biostar.

However, China also have another group of how educate called industry weapons or health weapons on, on Chinese medicine oriented molecules. I'm also very familiar with the case. So, so this area basically also satisfy, the expectation in 2015 or beyond that. And another thing I should emphasize is a cluster effect is that industrial network cluster effect.

This cluster will strengthening the, the results of achievements, for example, in semiconductors. It really, gap beyond my expectation is because this cluster effect maybe. The research layer is not the, the, the, the best talent. However, lots of people come in here and lots of, you know, new graduate from the, the, the correspondent major come in.

And that truly accelerated the the r and d and also industrialization, I think the biggest obstacle of today, for example, in Silicon Valley today, there is another group of people support initiated by Peter T Okay. Right wing accelerationist. They have a similar emphasize, you know, on heart attack.

Of course they want to choose military tech to become, for example, unreal and so on to, doing similar things. However, I think the biggest challenge for them is they don't have, you know, enough, industrialization basis, particular industry, network and cluster. They don't have. And this cluster network definitely in China.

Steve Hsu: Yeah.

Jian Lian: River Delta and Pearl River Delta, and also other areas which Western doesn't know. We know many cluster in the inland province in China who produce

Steve Hsu: Good. Let me ask you two questions. coming back to the state grid, so this traditional emphasis in China on developing its electrical capabilities. My impression is that in China they've mastered ultra high voltage transmission, long range transmission,

Jian Lian: Mm-hmm.

Steve Hsu: and the, the stereotype or the, I think the impression a lot of people have in the west is that solar is hype because of the intermittency problem.

Because the, the sun is only shining some number of hours and the grids here cannot handle this. You, you have to build enough failover capacity so that when the sun is not shining or the wind is not blowing, you can turn on all this other generation. My impression is that because the grid is more advanced in China, they can reliably shift power around the whole country from very sunny northwest regions.

To the eastern seaboard. So can you talk about what the general impression is within China, about the future of solar and other renewable energies and, and how it interacts with the grid?

Jian Lian: Firstly, lemme talk a little bit about the, the, the development of state grid. Okay. It's actually not only technology development, but also there in it is a key development strategy making process. This also dispute money is also integrated with some ideological bias. So the ultra high voltage technology was decided by one super strong man in the development is called Yutong YEA, he was called the China's you know, electric Network Emperor.

He rule this company, super company from a year, early 21st century when state grid was legally formed. It's a reform result of reform of China's ministry of electricity. And then the, I I remember June, 2014 or 2015, so personally decided that actual high voltage should be adopted because such ideology got in in electricity, technology area.

They also have ideology. So ultra voltage technology was thinking to pro decentralize. They also pro decentralize. So China's way is that because is history deciding the pathway, the event pathway to adopt this. But at a certain time we also adopted flexible, transmission technology and then become, you know, complementary to each other.

Basically. It's like this, I'm not top, expert. I, might imagine is like this. Because that's for the new energy, yes, it is, uh, intermittent. It'sinter usually interrupted by clouds not only at night, night day shift, character. They need some kinds of strong G grid absorb the, the, the impact of, of this change.

So I think ultra voltage technology provides the, spine for, for these networks, nature and flexible, you know, in this, uh, big network, we could build up lots of, you know, energy reserve facility. Not only chemical, but also hydro, you know, and thenthe flexible, we are adding up some flexible transmission technology.

So this become a super strong network. And remember the, the outro voltage technology development and also the, the, the infrastructure development of our grid is happened before. The super surge of new energy installation in China and that, that took place, I think on 2007, 2008, and then it started massive building up already before 2015.

And China, by the way, I should say that Trump is, in our view, that is truly, you know, speak like idiot because he saying that China is not installing wind power well, we have lots of wind power. If you could fly to China, you can see from a plant, you can see lots of solar panels like sea or lake or oceans.

And also you know, the wind power installed here, here, here, here. And let's, uh, actually start a series, I think after 2012, for wind powers, even early is 2007, 2006, already building up. And solar is 2000 after 2011, 2012. And, and later it even further accelerated, I think during COVID periods because in COVID periods, lots of new energy infrastructure installation in China. Every, every roofs of the, the factories, every roof of the buildings, even residential buildings, and not only like by this, but also for example, hills, the mountains in, in, in the southwestern China and also in know data of northwestern Chinas all covered by the solar panels.

So, so China produced, China installed, actually, lemme tell you, I want to push it overseas to global south countries that what we doing in Coopering with our countries. So, so that is the solar energy story. But what I should add, one thing is that the topic related to climate change topic, I know, I know that you also interview some people in the United States about this topic.

And also, you know that in MAGA in the so-called conservative, there is argument against this. My attitude is painful. So perhaps you have never seen a person who supports new energy, a new energy vehicle, including solar winds and, and, and BYD and these Tesla. Of course, I also support that, but at the same time, I doubt about the climate change theory. I doubt about climate change theory. I don't think that is true science. So in this point I, I'm agree.

Steve Hsu: yeah. Yeah. You and I, you and I think the same. I support all of these new, energy technologies, but I also think the climate models are not nearly as good as what the scientists who work on them claim. There's huge uncertainty about what's gonna happen if we don't solve the climate problem, we don't really know what's gonna happen.

But I support all these technologies actually, I think just purely on economics. I mean, if you have a highly functional state grid, like the one in China, the cheapest way for them to add energy is actually solar and some of these renewable technologies. So

Jian Lian: Yeah.

Steve Hsu: it just purely economic grounds, it's, it's gonna win, I think.

Jian Lian: It causes down very low, even lower and coal you know, power station. And actually, you know, I, we even have to remind Russia that you have to, you know, prepare early because maybe we are no longer, firstly, your oil u and, and later even your, your gas may be, you know, not so un unless chemistry, you know, chemistry industry can absorb these, raw materials.

Otherwise, for energy use, we don't need that.

Steve Hsu: Exactly. The gas might be used not for energy, but as input into production of,

Jian Lian: Chemistry. Yeah.

Steve Hsu: Okay. Another question for you, and if, if this is not an area of your expertise or you don't have any special knowledge, do, you can just skip it, but when will China get EUV extreme ultraviolet lithography? What rumors are you hearing about domestic EUV.

Jian Lian: Well, I should say that that is a very specific for example, milestone in the semiconductor development and many politicians and analysts in the West is focused on this. Well, my attitude is that just following my experience of the momentum has gotten actually for semiconductor. I'm not worried about it after 2019 because even early 2019, when many people still doubt about that ally, you know, China's, graphic machine, whether we can achieve that.

If you invest some money and with the China hidden true, you got something because for example, am you know, Netherlands companies wise is also not not magic. It is a, it is a rise, is it is some, you know, not very, you know, top talent. Sometimes top talent has an idea and is implemented things, something in, in that development machine tool, some Taiwanese, you know, um, s okay emerge or this idea should be do, but many of such, milestone, I mean in this very specific niche area, such innovation is, how to say engineer level.

So China doesn't have any problem on engineer level innovation. And because there's so many, you know, tailored cluster here, you, you, I say, I say just give chance to those, especially younger generation who has some idea and let him try. And then you as a system, you get this evolution very fast. So I, I'm not worried about, about this in 2019.

I, I think that is basically no problem. And by the way, I should say that on 2022 there is,, Biden Administration's cheap act. So we think that is, so molecule is also making wrong way because they're focused on advancedprocessing. And now they, they have got, got, realize that I say that ordinary, level processing is also very important because most of the achieves, you know, including, you know, our related to our daily life, including automobile is not, does not mean that, you know, for example, seven nanometers, they don't need that.

So we're not worried. And, and then for your, your question on this the simple answer is that I'm not worried about this, just that Huawei leading to that and so on. Okay. And you could get results. Yeah. Mm-hmm.

Steve Hsu: Got it. Okay. Well, we've been on well over an hour. Let me, let me finish up by letting you make some predictions. So, what is going to happen in terms of Chinese economic or technological development or in the competition between the US and China? That will surprise Western analysts. What, what's a surprising prediction that you believe in?

Jian Lian: Because of the, the, the trends how do you say it? They define what is tackling, what's not. So they ignore many of us aspect of what China is good at and China dominant. What today, for example the concern about real earth issue, lemme tell you, I think there's 100 real earth, area in, in, actually, if China won't, and China leadership knows about that there's 100 choice candidate area, we, we can have impact on the United States.

So I think that China is basically how to say that on the way of quickly development and, also, including making some new areas, totally new areas of technology development. And that's, I in general, I think United States should know more about, understand more about China, particularly those mar people.

I mean, for example, she should not focus on their so-called, his rumor that lease, uh, drug United States should come to China to see what's happening and learn from something that can study, learn from here and, and then go back to think about it.. That is the area we didn't touch much about today. I think United States do have some chance on there, but study from some simple area.

basically my, my thinking. And also, for me personally, I, what I, I promote here that is China should go, we should consider, because I, I think globalization is over in this point. I'm very similar to MAGA people. So on China's side, I'm thinking for China strategies that we go global south.

We should build up a, Chinese including our economic, financial circle here, economy circle, and making them to industry not maybe at least development. Okay. They, they never, they can never achieve what, what China has achieved on industry network, because China is super large country, but they can join this network, join circle, and then I should say artificial market could be created.

And those imagination of oversupply in China. So because of logic today in many of the including the MAGA, is that we just that, and then we could get the suffocate this Chinese industry making it not able to export. Well, I should say that, don't expect too much on that. The Western consumer market is the god of Chinese industry. We could invent its own markets in global south if we want. And also in China, actually, China's living standard is also quite more than as you come to China. So, that is our size promotion. Okay.

Steve Hsu: Do you think the Trump administration learned through this tariff process that they actually cannot win a tariff war against China? Do you think they realize that now?

Jian Lian: I think they realize a little bit, but still they have hope on the tariff strategy. But on my opinion, tariff strategy, totally use this. We have 100 early, rare earth area to implement if he again launched tariff war.

Steve Hsu: yeah. Okay. Final question. 10 years from now, if I put a million dollars into the Chinese stock market

Jian Lian: Mm-hmm.

Steve Hsu: in 10 years, will I, will I outperform the s and p 500?

Jian Lian: Well, that is I think that is only area, which I would say probably not, because that is related to how to say that the different national strategy. Of course China today. Also pay attention to the, to the, how to say, the positive cycle in China, stock market. For example, some companies, including I, I, I believe BYD still have lots of, uh, potential to grow.

If you thinking about financial return, if you, if Chinese you are not appreciate against your stock, I mean clear, keep the change rates stable, by the way, I think that is un not good because actually that is a result by some pro western financial aid in Chinese, in Chinese Central Bank.

But, I should say that American stock market performs so well because it's kinds of, not actually conspiracy, buteverybody is pushing, you know, a United States go low up, up, up, up forever, however. The, the, for example, really economy support, the USA store market is not good. You know, so the same, for example, even a company which is much smaller than Chinese counterparts, he's enjoying very, very high valuation in, in US store market.

So if you are printing money or creating currency to, to raise up the stock market, and by the way you, that is still relying on US dollars still as a haga currency globally, how can China play on that, on stock market? So, but in China's side, in hong our com, our ruler side is that it's maybe net number one important.

Okay? We could make a Chinese stock market reasonable growing up, and some of the good companies, for example, BYD or Cambodia or some, some these companies as MIC, they could grow up and maybe new companies grow up. And not only on these pipeline, but also for example, on real economy, on special steel, on chemistry, we could have a similar.

Good job done companies, but we don't pursue that Seven seven Sisters in United States. Okay. That is unhealthy actually, that, that, that widens the, the society's wealth gap. Okay. So that is not the good, good things only making the, oligarch richer and richer United States. so that is basically my, my theory on this, and

Steve Hsu: Okay, but you didn't answer my question. So you, you have a million dollars and you have to either put it into an index for the Chinese market or the s and p 500, and your children are gonna get the benefit of the returns,

Jian Lian: well, that is from your point view, American citizen my suggestion that for the Chinese if you want to invest in China, just invest on the Chinese uh, the very, very trustful company like VYD, you just put 100% on VYD. I think that good choice, not only a, you know, index share, okay.

I know it is, it is just fluctuating something like this, you know

Steve Hsu: I, I have two big positions in Chinese, equities. One is BYD and the other one is Alibaba. And I've both, both, both have, both have done well for me in the last, couple years. So.

Jian Lian: Okay.

Steve Hsu: All right.

Jian Lian: yeah.

Steve Hsu: Jian Lian, thank you so much for your time. I'm sure my audience enjoyed hearing from you. And hopefully we'll have you back on the show again sometime in the future.

Jian Lian: I'm looking forward also to discuss other topic in future. Yeah.

Steve Hsu: Great.

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